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INTRODUCTION
A contract of reinsurance is one by which an insurer contracts
with a third person to insure him against loss or liability by reason of
such original insurance.^ In a very real sense, a reinsurer is an
insurance company's insurer. Just as an individual consumer will pay
to insure himself against catastrophic financial loss, so will an
insurance company surrender a portion of its premiums to a reinsurer
in order to obtain protection from exceptional or unforeseen losses.
^
Reinsurance is accomplished by way of contract of indemnity and may
either be on an individual risk basis or on the basis of the assumption
of certain lines or classes of business. Reinsurers produce their
business either by directly soliciting primary insurers or by the
acceptance from a small number of specialized reinsurance
intermediary firms which structure and place reinsurance programs.
The most rudimentary purpose of reinsurance is to disperse or spread
the risk of loss, but reinsurance also serves a variety of subsidiary
functions which are indispensable to the life of an insurance company.
Reinsurance can be utilized to increase the undrewriting capacity of an
insurance company; it can also serve to stabilize the underwriting
1. Cal. Ins. Code 620 (West 1972)
2. Thompson, Critical Issues of the Eighties: How Trends in Reinsurance Will Affect
Legal, Legislative, and Regulatory AcUons. 16 Forum 1038 (1981)
2result of an insurance company by paying its losses incurred over a
fixed retention.
3
Traditionally, the reinsurance relationship is frequently
characterized as an exercise of fiduciary responsibility based upon an
undertaking of utmost good faith between contracting parties whose
fortunes are interdependent. Nevertheless, disputes arise as in any
commercial endeavor. Litigation involving reinsurance between the
parties to the reinsurance contract has been particularly rare. Most of
the litigation that has been between reinsurers and persons not party
to the reinsurance agreement. Perhaps most notable is litigation
prompted by the insolvency of a party to the reinsurance agreement."*
This thesis first discusses the relationship between reinsurer
and reinsured. Particular attention is focused on:
(a) whether the duty of disclosure in the reinsurance context rises to a
"fiduciary" duty.
(b) issues concerning reinsurers involvement in the defense of claims,
and
(c) liability of reinsurer to reimburse ceding company for losses
resulting from ceding company's failure to perform contractual
obligation.
Additionally, the thesis recognizes that courts are increasingly prone
to allow punitive damage claims and uphold punitive damage awards.^
3. Id. at 1040
4. Franklin W. Nutter. Reinsurance In The Liquidation Of Insolvent Insurers. 18
Forum at 290
5. Donald W. Rees and Carol E. Reese. Reinsurance: The Basic and Bad Failh
ConsideraUons, 39 FICC Q at 343 (1989)
3When ceding insurers ask tJieir reinsurers to contribute to the
payment of punitive damage assessed against the former for its bad
faith in the settlement or defense of a claim, conflicts frequently arise.
There are two types of punitive damage awards for which a ceding
company may request reimbursement. The first type is an award of
punitive damages against the insured; the second type is an award
against the ceding company, typically for bad faith.
^
The second major area of analysis in this thesis concerns several
basic reinsurance-related issues stemming from the insolvency of
insurers. When a ceding company is unable to pay insurance proceeds
to its insureds or to third party claimants as a result of insolvency,
such parties often seek to recover reinsurance proceeds directly from
the reinsurer. However, reinsurance is an indemnity relationship in
which persons not party to the reinsurance agreement have no
interest and are not privy. The insolvency of the reinsured does not
affect this fundamental premise.
Finally, this thesis discusses the insolvency dilemma that the
insurance industry has encountered in recent years and examines
some possible options available to reinsurers and reinsureds in their
efforts to stabilize their practices in the reinsurance business. When
disputes involving reinsurance arise, the parties to reinsurance
contracts have resorted first to negotiations. Where they fail,
contracts more commonly require the parties to arbitrate their
differences. However, there are still some disadvantages in
reinsurance arbitration. Where arbitration fails, the parties to a
6. Id.
4reinsurance contract may litigate. The decisions whether to include
an arbitration clause in a contract and what provision to pjut in it, and
whether to take advantage of arbitration once a dispute arises are not
simple. Given the number of insolvencies over the past few years, and
the likelihood that a dispute will arise after liquidation, the right to
arbitrate disputes after insolvency has become an important issue to
reinsurer.
CHAPTER 1
The Relationship Between Reinsurer and Reinsured
Reinsurers assume a part of the risk assumed by their reir sured.
They insure insurers. The reinsurance relationship is a contractual
relationship whereby the reinsurer undertakes to indemnify the
reinsured for liability incurred under a contract of insurance. The
reinsurance relationship is often characterized as undertakings of
utmost good faith between contracting parties. Under traditional
reinsurance arrangements the primary insurer remains fully and
directly liable to the underlying insured for the full coverage of the
policy, notwithstanding the reinsurance contract. Based on this
principle, the reinsured company has the sole responsibility and
discretion to defend or settle suits or claims, while the reinsurer
usually retains a right to associate in the defense of any action. The
ceding company's duty to defend and investigate and its obligation to
advise the reinsurer of all claims and subsequent developments which
might involve the reinsurer, taken together with the reinsurer's right
to associate, constitutes the basis for the reinsurer's emerging
oversight activities.
6A. Utmost Good Faith
Contracts of reinsurance are of "utmost good faith. "^ Inherent in
the concept of " utmost good faith" is the duty of the reinsured to
disclose all known information material to the risk.*^ Once a
reinsurance agreement is executed, the dealings between the parties
are not generally at arms-length. In many ways the ceding carrier is in
a more advantageous position than the reinsurer in that the reinsurer's
relationship is with the ceding company only. The reinsurer generally
has no contact with the insured while the ceding company usually has
firsthand knowledge of the type and quality of the business being
written. Furthermore, the ceding company is usually intimately
involved in the handling of claims. The reinsurer must rely upon the
reinsured to properly reserve the claim and give timely notice to the
reinsurer where appropriate. In Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v.
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Providence, the court found that the
reinsurer "must depend upon the knowledge, judgment, diligence and
good faith of the ceding company in investigating and appraising the
risk, placing the original insurance and making investigations and
adjustments in the event of loss, ".^ It then held that the ceding
company owed to the reinsurers an obligation of the highest good
faith.
7. See Security Mutual Gas. Co. v. Affiliated Fm Ins. Co.. 471 F.2d 238. 246 (8th Cir 1972)
8. California Insurance Code 622 (West 1972) provides:
Where an insurer obtains reinsurance, he must communicate all the representations of
the original insured, and also all the knowledge and information he posses, whether
previously or subsequently acquired, which are material to the risk.
9. See Northwester Mut. Fire Ass'n Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Providence. R.I., 50
F.Supp. 785, 788 (W.D. Wash. 1943)
7The duty of disclosure may depend on the kind of reinsurance at
issue. In general, there are three basic forms of reinsurance: excess,
facultative, and pro rata. '° Under facultative reinsurance, a ceding
company may offer the reinsurer any individual risk, which the
reinsurer is free to accept or reject^' That arrangement provides
f exibility to both the reinsurer and the ceding company. The
reinsurer can select the types of risk it is willing to accept, and the
ceding company can accept greater- and a wide variety of - primary
risks. 12 Additionally, facultative reinsurance can serve to limit the
potential exposure of the ceding company and its other reinsurers.'^
Excess and pro rata reinsurance agreements, usually classified as
treaties, 1^ are obligatory in nature. Under pro rata treaties, a ceding
company and its reinsurer share premiums and losses in some
proportion. Excess treaties, on the other hand, are concerned with
the amount of loss, to the extent that losses in excess of some agreed-
upon retention or deductible are paid by the reinsurer. '^ In the case
of facultative reinsurance, the duty requires the disclosure of " facts
ordinarily known at the time concerning the insurance risk of the
property or interest to be reinsured." "^ However, the negotiation of a
reinsurance treaty will commonly precede the cession of individual
policies under the treaty. Therefore, in most instances, the
10. Green. Risk And Insurance 176-178 (3d ed. 1973)
11. Moore. Reinsurance- Sharing the Risk. Brief. May 1980. at 15
12. Id. al 16
13. Id.
14. Greene, note 10 supra, at 177
15. Greene, note 10 supra
.
at 177-78
16. Strain (ed.) . Reinsurance 6 (1980) at 10
8underwriting information required to be disclosed during treaty
negotiations must be in " general and anticipatory terms." '"^
A reinsurance contract may be invalidated by a ceding company's
misrepresentation, just as in a contract of original insurance.'"
However, misrepresenting a fact will not affect the validity of a
transaction unless the fact misrepresented is considered material. A
fact is considered material to a reinsurer if its misrepresentation
deprives the reinsurer of its opportunity to accept or reject the ceding
company's proposal. However, a mere nondisclosure of material facts
does not provide a basis for rescission of the reinsurance contract
unless it is fraudulent.'^
Whether the duty of disclosure in the reinsurance context rises
to a " fiduciary" duty is clear. Recent case law suggests that a court
may be inclined to find that a fiduciary relationship exists between a
reinsurer and its reinsured where treaty, rather than facultative
reinsurance, is involved. In American Re-Insurance Co. v. MGIC
Investment Corp. ,20 the ceding company sought reinsurance for a lease
guarantee program. After conducting the preliminary actuarial study
used to derive a premium rate for the program, the ceding company
learned that the actuary's findings had omitted a key factor, resulting
in a lower rate. Additional actuarial studies were undertaken which
disclosed that a higher premium rate was necessary to the success of
the program. When the cedent presented the details of the program
17. Id.
18. Carter. Reinsurance 1 19 (2d ed. 1983 )
19. See General Reinsurance Corp. v. Southern Surety Co. of Des Moines. Iowa . 27 F. 2d
265. 273 (8th Cir. 1928)
20. No. 77 CH1457 { 111. Cir. Ct. Cook County. Ch. Div. Oct. 20. 1987)
9to the reinsurer, it disclosed only the initial actuarial report reflectinjf
the lower premium charge. In finding that" utmost good faith is an
element of a fiduciary relationship in which one's word is deemed to
be trustworthy, "21 the court reasoned that the fact that the reinsurance
involved was treaty reinsurance inherently required Am-Re to place its
trust in the reinsured. As such, the ceding company had a duty of full
disclosure, which it breached when it misrepresented the actuarial
study regarding the premium rate. In the court's view, the ceding
company also had a duty to keep the reinsurer apprised and informed
about the types of risks that were being reinsured and the ceding
company's plans, goals, and operations, which it also failed to do.
Rejecting the reinsured's argument that it owed merely a duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and not a fiduciary duty to Am-Re. the
court explained:
The dealings between Am-Re and the defendants were not
at armslength. Only the reinsured close the risks to be
reinsured by Am-Re; Am-Re accepted these risks in good faith....
Am-Re had no power of choice. Control was in the hands of the
reinsured.... The success or failure of the treaty lay in the
acceptance of risks which was essentially the sole responsibility
of the reinsured. This treaty, therefore, could not exist without
trust, without the imposition of a fiduciary duty between the
parties. The nature of the treaty required Am-Re to place a
grate deal of trust in the integrity of the reinsured. 22
21. Id. at 40
22. Id. at 42-43
10
Even if a court is unwilling to find the existence of treaty
reinsurance, it may be inclined to find such a relationship as to at least
some aspects of the treaty. In Mutuelle Generale Francaise Vie v. Life
Assurance Co. of Pennsylvania." which involved treaty reinsurance, the
federal court found that the reinsurer had alleged sufficient facts in its
first amended complaint to support a finding that the ceding company
had a fiduciary duty as to the administration of the ceded business.
Under the treaty, the ceding company was responsible for providing
information on the policies, forwarding the premiums, and
investigating and paying claims. The reinsurer had no control over the
issuance of the policies, and no contact with the policyholders, and
was therefore entitled to place its highest faith in the ceding company
with respect to the administration of its treaty responsibilities.
In determining whether a fiduciary relationship existed, the
district court, sitting in diversity, looked to Illinois case law for an
appropriate test:
Such a fiduciary relationship may be presumed from the
very relationship of the parties... or may be found to exist in a
particular situation where confidence is reposed on one side and
there is a resulting superiority and influence on the other side.^''
Utilizing this test, the court concluded that the ceding company
maintained a dominant and influential position in carrying out its
reporting and administrative obligations. However, the court refused
to find that a fiduciary relationship existed as to the selection of the
policies to be reinsured, because the cedent was compelled to cede
23. 688 F.Supp. 386 (N.D. lU. 1988)
24. Id. al 386 . 398 (N.D. 111. 1988)
11
those policies specifically defined in the treaty. According to the
court, the ceding company's responsibilities in the selection process
were effectively ministerial so there was no resulting position of
superiority or influence to establish a fiduciary duty. The court
distinguished MGIC Investment, wherein a fiduciary relationship was
found to exist between the reinsurer and cedent with regard to the
selection process, because there, the ceding company had total
control over the risks to be reinsured under the treaty, and the
reinsurer had no choice but to place a great deal of trust in the ceding
company.
The district court in Mutuelle was careful to note that, with the
exception of MGIC Investment which has no real precedential value.
Illinois courts have not yet addressed whether a fiduciary duty always
exists between a ceding company and a reinsurer. 25 Conversely, in
Morrison Assurance Co. v. North Am. Reinsurance Corp.,^^ where
facultative reinsurance was involved, the court rejected the argument
that a confidential relationship always exists by and between a
reinsurer and its reinsured, finding instead that parties to a
reinsurance relationship are experienced and sophisticated companies
dealing at arm's length. Consequently, the court conclude that no
confidential or fiduciary relationship between the ceding company and
its reinsurer.
Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The implications of the covenant of good faith and fair
25. Jonathan F. Bank And Karean L. Bizzini. "Fraud" in the Conlexl of Reinsurance, 40
FICCQat 131 (1990)
26. 588 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (N.D. Ala 1984)
12
dealing have not been the subject of many decisions dealing with
reinsurance. In American Re-Insurance Co. v. MGIC Investment
Corp.. 27 the court has suggested that there is a distinction between the
duty of utmost good faith and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
In Central National Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Prudential Reinsi ranee
Co., 28 the court reversed the trial court's holding that the reinsurer
had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 29
The court found that tort demands are not recoverable against a
reinsurer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.3o
B. Reinsurer's Involvement in the Defense of Claims
Typically, the reinsurance contract provides that although the
ceding carrier retains control of any claim, suit or proceeding, the
reinsurer is allowed at its own expense the opportunity to associate in
the defense and control of any such claim, suit or proceeding which
may involve the reinsurance with the full cooperation of the reinsured.
This is commonly referred to as the"claims cooperation" clause. An
example of the type of provision commonly found in reinsurance
agreements which grants to the reinsurer the "right to associate" in
the defense of underlying claims may be in words or substance, as
follows:
While the reinsurer does not undertake to investigate or defend
claims or suits, it shall nevertheless have the right and be given
27. No. 77 CH 1457 (111. Cir. Ct., Cook County. Ch. Div. Oct. 20. 1987)
28. 196CaI.App. 3d 1319(1987)
29. Id. at 362
30. Id. at 359
13
the opportunity to associate with the reinsured and its
representatives at the reinsurer's own expense in the defense
and control of any claim, suit, or proceeding which may involve
this reinsurance with the full cooperation of the reinsures.^'
Most commonly, the reinsurance contract provides that the ceding
carrier is to provide to the reinsirer "prompt notice... of any
occurrence or accident which, without regard to liability, appears
likely to involve this reinsurance...." In general, "prompt" notice as
required in notice clauses has been interpreted to mean that notice
must be given in " a reasonable time under the circumstances. "^^
Failure by the ceding company to give such reasonable notice generally
bars the recovery of reinsurance proceeds. ^^
The reinsurer's motivation for increasing its involvement in a
ceding company's claim and defense activities is evident. Reinsurer's
involvement in a claim or case, by contract or by its actions, will be so
significant as to invalidate the lack of privity to persons not party to
the reinsurance agreement, thereby subjecting the reinsurer to direct
liability. The reinsurer may also become subject to statutory and civil
standards for claim settlement practices, or a legal relationship with
the ceding company not originally contemplated by the agreement is
established. 24 However, there is case law to guide the reinsurer into
the safe limits of involvement. In Peerless Casualty Co. v. Inland
Mutual Ins. .2^ the court found the reinsurer to be a joint venture with
31. Donald W. Rees And Carol E. Reese. Reinsurance: The Basic and Bad Faith
Considerations, 39 FICC Q at 330 (1989)
32. 13A Appleman. Insurance L^w And Practice 7697 at 551 (1976ed)
33. Id.
34. Franklin W. Nutter. 34 FICC Q at 153 (1984)
35. 251 F. 2d 696 (4Lh Cir. 1958)
14
tJie ceding company on the basis of a "follow the fortunes" clause in
the contract. The court acknowledged that the reinsurer undertook
no unusual actions with respect to the claim; however, the reinsurer's
failure to exercise its right to associate counsel with the ceding
company placed it in a position of having the ceding company's
negligence imputed to it. Contrasted to this, however, is the case of
Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. American Fidelity Co..^^ Again, the
reinsurer was not involved in the claim determination; however, the
court found no liability because the contract did not contain "follow
the fortunes" language and there was no factual evidence of a joint
venture.
A "follow the fortunes" clause is quite common in reinsurance
contracts, sometimes referred to as "follow the settlement" clause.
Such clauses mean that the reinsurer has agreed to abide by any
settlement made by the original insurer. The rational of such clauses
is to do away with the need to prove a loss under the original
insurance contract. This clause served a very practical purpose.
"Follow the fortunes" clauses are intended to preclude reinsurers from
objecting to or questioning the validity of good faith settlements made
by reinsureds in cases where there is no dispute as to coverage of the
underlying claim under the original policy.
Although the reinsurer has historically played a passive role in
the defense of underlying insurance claims, reinsurers today should
and increasingly do seek to assert their rights to participate in the
defense of such claims. ^^ Because of the increasing complexity of
36. 196 F.Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1959)
37. Sullivan. Reinsurance in the Age of Crisis. 38 FlCC Q. al 2
1
15
coverage and claims, the heightened judicial scrutiny of the
reinsurers' role, and the economic necessity of monitoring reserves, it
is becoming more and more necessary for them to do so.^"
C. Liability of Reinsurer to Reimburse Ceding Carrier for Losses
Resulting from Ceding Carrier's Failure to Perform Contractual
Obligation
Courts in states throughout the country have recognized
numerous different causes of action which are available to insureds or
their assigns who contend that their carrier has not fulfilled its
contractual obligations. Such theories of recovery vary from the more
traditional concepts of negligent failure to settle or failure of counsel
to act in the best interest of the insured as opposed to the insurer, to
the more recently recognized causes of action of breach of the
carrier's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the insured,
violation of a state's consumer protection statute, and violation of a
state's insurance code. When faced with claims by the insured that it
has not fulfilled its contractual obligations, the ceding carrier often
looks to its reinsurer for support and ultimately reimbursement. More
and more often, arbitration panels and courts are being asked to
determine whether damages imposed against an insurer as a result of
its failure to properly perform its contractual obligations are covered
by the reinsurance contract. ^^
38. Id. at 119
39. Keith Drummond And W. Neil Rambin, Common Consideration For Counsel
Representing Reinsurers. 39 FICC Q. at 179
16
Despite the frequency of claims by reinsureds for
reimbursement from their reinsurers for damages incurred as a result
of their own misdeeds, there are very few judicial opinions regarding
the validity of such claims. This presumably results from the historical
reluctance of insurers and reinsurers to pursue disputes into the
courts. Most reinsurance disputes which are not resolved amicably are
submitted arbitration panels pursuant to mandatory arbitration clauses
in their reinsurance contracts.
In at least two cases courts have held that damages assessed
against the ceding carrier for its failure to honor its contractual
obligations is not the type of loss which comes within the purview of a
typical reinsurance contract. "^^ As explained by one commentator, the
typical reinsurance contract covers only that liability which the ceding
carrier assumes under the insurance policies it writes, including
punitive damages, but not damages which are assessed against the
ceding carrier for something it did or did not do in the handling of
the claim."*'
Even though the reinsurer is not generally liable for the ceding
carrier's misdeeds, some reinsurance contracts expressly provide for
reinsurance coverage for certain types of damages and/or liabilities
which might be assessed against the reinsured as a result of its
wrongful conduct. Such coverage includes what has come to be called
the "judgement in excess of policy limits" clause, which is designed to
define the basis of a reinsurer's participation in losses in excess of the
40. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 196 F. Supp. 553
(W.D. Mo. 1959); Duber Industrial Security, Ins. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 2d Civ.
No. 69133 (Cal. App.. 2d Dist., Feb. 16. 1984)
41. Hanger, Punitive Damage- Insurance and Reinsurance, 47 Ins. Couns. J. 72.75 (1985)
17
original policy limits. Often it describes a reinsurer's obligation for or
exclusion of punitive damages.
Other senarlors might arise where the ceding carrier can
successfully argue that the imposition of compensatory and /or punitive
damages for its misdeeds are reinsured. A number of reinsurance
contracts contain a "follow the fortunes" clause. The purpose of such a
clause is to prevent a reinsurer from second-guessing the
discretionary decisions which the reinsured must often make in the
handling of a claim. A ceding carrier might certainly argue the
clause's presence precludes the reinsurer from denying liability for
additional losses incurred as a result of actions of the ceding carrier in
the handling of a claim which where taken in good faith to reduce
exposure to both the ceding carrier and the reinsurer. On the other
hand, it has been said that while the "follow the fortunes" clause is
designed to require that the reinsurer respond in circumstances not
expressly contemplated in the reinsurance contract, it is not intended
to encompass activities of the reinsured which are actionable. '^^
Suppose the reinsurer is fully informed of the significant
developments of the handling of the underlying claim and either
actively or passively consents to same. Can it then be argued that the
reinsurer should reimburse the ceding company? Once the reinsurer
becomes involved in the claims handling process and either directs or
consents to the reinsured's conduct, the reinsured can argue that it is
only appropriate that the reinsurer bear its portion of the
consequences of same. In Peerless v. Inland Mutual Ins. Company, the
42. Dowd, PuniUve or Extra-Contractual Award Against Insurers: The Reinsurer's Role.
28FIC. Q. 281,284(1978)
18
inclusion of the "follow the fortunes" clause and the participation of
the reinsurer did lead the court to affirm a judgment against a
reinsurer by a ceding carrier. The ceding carrier was seeking
reimbursement for a portion of an excess-of-policy-limits award which
it became liable to pay its insured as result of its failure to settle a
third party claim. In light of the "follow the fortunes" clause and the
reinsurer's informed acquiescence in the settlement decisions of the
ceding carrier, the court concluded that the sound and unsound
decisions of the reinsured became those of reinsurer. Thus the
reinsurer was bound along with the ceding carrier, and the liability of
the reinsurer was to follow that of the reinsured. "^^
D. Punitive Damages
A major source of contention between reinsurers and reinsured
arises when ceding insurers ask their reinsurers to contribute to the
payment of punitive damage awards.'*'* The question of whether a
reinsurance contract provides coverage for punitive damages depends
upon the terms and provisions of the reinsurance agreement and the
underwriting policy. In other words, if the underlying policy does not
cover punitive damages, then the reinsurer will not be liable under the
reinsurance agreement to the reinsured who pays punitive damages on
behalf of its insured. ''^ A related issue is whether the reinsurance
agreement covers damages assessed against the reinsured for the
latter's torts in the handling of underlying claims. Whether punitive
43. Id. at 704
44. Sullivan, note 37 supra, at 14
45. Id. at 15
19
damages are covered under a particular reinsurance contract
ultimately rests on the insurability of such damages. In many states,
the preclusion of insurance for punitive damages applied only to
intentional conduct and only ten states hold punitive damages
uninsurable for non-intentional conduct. Of those ten states, six
permit insurability of punitive damages where vicariously imposed.
Restated, only four states absolutely preclude the insurability of
punitive damages.'*^
There are two types of punitive damage awards for which a
ceding company may request reimbursement. The first type is an
award of punitive damages against policyholders; the second type is an
award against the ceding company, typically for bad faith. ''^
1. Punitive Damages Assessed Against Policyholders
In Central National Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Prudential Reinsurance
Co.."*^ the court held that payment of claims excluded under the
original policy is a valid defense to a reinsurer's liability under the
reinsurance contract. A "follow the fortunes" clause does not preclude
the reinsurer from asserting that the claims are excluded from
coverage under the reinsurance contract. ''^ In Pru-Re. the ceding
company paid a settlement of an underlying action against its insured
in which compensatory and punitive damages were awarded at trial.
Prudential Reinsurance, one of the reinsurers of the underlying policy.
46. John W. Morrison, Punitive Damages And Why Lhe Reinsurer Cares. 20 Forum 1987.
at 74
47. Donald W. Reese And Carol E. Reese, note 31 supra, at 343
48. 196 Cal. App. 3d 342
49. Id. at 353
20
denied any liability under the reinsurance contract to the ceding
company on the grounds that the damages awarded were excluded by
the underlying policy and thus, in turn, were not covered by the
reinsurance contract.
Prudential Reinsurance filed a declaratory relief action, which
was consolidated with the subsequently filed action of the ceding
company against the reinsurer for breach of contract and bad faith.
The breach of contract and bad faith action was tried first. At the trial,
the court prevented Prudential Reinsurance from raising the payment
of excluded claims as a defense on the basis that its denial of coverage
amounted to a waiver of its right to dispute subsequent settlements
made by the ceding company. ^° The declaratory relief action was
dismissed. In reversing the trial court's exclusion of the evidence
relating to the reinsurer's defense of payment of excluded claims, the
Pru-Re court noted:
The extent of a reinsurer's liability is determined by the
language of the reinsurance contract. Once a reinsured sustains
a loss, "a debt from the reinsurer to the reinsured arises on the
loss. The case stands between them upon the terms of the
policy and the facts connected with the loss at the time the
reinsurers are sued, and the reinsurer may make the same
objections and raise the same defenses which the reinsured
could in a suit on the primitive policy. "^^
A reinsured's payment to its insured is not in and of itself
determinative of a reinsurer's obligation to indemnify its
50. Id. at 352
51. Id. at 353
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reinsured.... A settlement of excluded claims does not
necessarily bind the reinsurer, even where, as here, the
reinsurer had denied coverage and filed a declaratory relief
action. The burden of separating the covered claims from the
excluded claims rests with the reinsured under the terms of this
reinsurance contract, and not with the reinsurer. The contract
permits the reinsurer to require the reinsured to present
satisfactory proof of covered claims. ^2
Similarly, in American Ins. Co. v. NACPAC.^^ ^q court held that a
"follow the fortunes" clause did not obligate a reinsurer to reimburse
the reinsured for any portion of a settlement of a punitive damage
award excluded under the insurance policy and reinsurance
agreement. In the underlying action, a jury awarded compensatory
and punitive damages against the original insured. While the award
was on appeal, the ceding company settled the case and requested
reimbursement from its reinsurer of that portion of the settlement
within the reinsurer's liability limits under the reinsurance agreement.
The reinsurer denied coverage under the reinsurance agreement for
any portion of the settlement.
In the ceding company's district court action in NACPAC against
the reinsurer, the reinsurer defended on the ground that the
underlying policy and therefore the reinsurance agreement did not
cover punitive damages assessed for intentional corporate
misconduct. ^4 Further, since the part of the settlement attributable to
52. Id. at 357
53. 697 F. 2d 79 (2d Cir. 1982)
54. Id. at 80
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payment of compensatory damages, which was covered under the
reinsurance agreement, was below the stated retention, the reinsurer
contended that it had no duty to reimburse the ceding company for
any portion of the settlement. ^^ The district court agreed and held
that the reinsurer owed nothing to the reinsured under the
reinsurance agreement. ^^ The second Circuit in NACPAC affirmed the
district court's ruling and noted that despite a "follow the fortunes"
clause in the reinsurance agreement, "it would be unfair to the
reinsurer to hold it liable for damages beyond the scope of its policy. "^^
In light of the Pru-Re and NACPAC decisions, the ceding
company may not blindly rely on "follow-the-fortunes" clauses in cases
involving questionable coverage. A more prudent course of action in
such cases is to consult with the reinsurer in advance of paying
settlements of doubtful claims to avoid the expense and effort of
needless litigation.
2. Bad Faith and Punitive Damages Assessed Against Ceding Company
The focal point for much of the reinsurers' concern is the
problem of extracontractual damages. Generally, the problem arises
when ceding insurers ask their reinsurers to contribute to the
payment of punitive damage assessed against the former for its bad
faith in the settlement or defense of a claim. The fundamental
economic question is whether coverage for extracontractual damages
should be provided by reinsurers. ^^ Much of the difficulty in this area
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 81
58. Thompson, note 2 supra, at 1051
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can be attributed to reinsurance contract draftsmanship. Reinsurance
contracts are generally construed as covering contractual obligations
only, in other words, if the primary insurance contract does not cover
punitive damages, then a reinsurer will not be liable to a reinsured
who pays punitives on behalf of its insured. Thus it is important that
reinsurers draft agreements with the utmost care, so ar to preclude
reinsurer liability for damages they might ordinarily and not
unreasonably regard as "extracontractual."
Insurers argue, however, that reinsurers should share in paying
extracontractual damages because such exposure is a fact of life in the
marketplace today. ^^ They contend that insurers should not alone be
required to pay these "new" costs associated with activities that
benefit both the insurer and the reinsurer. ^° An unrelenting truth of
recent tort doctrine has been the heightening standards of conduct
for all types of professions and businesses, with the predictable
increases in tort liability. Insurers have responded to those increases
by paying contested claims and attempting to pass the costs along to
their reinsurers. ^^ Reinsurers, in turn, have withdrawn from the
market.
For the most part, the general principle that the extent of a
reinsurer's liability is governed by the language of the reinsurance
contract applied to the issue of "bad faith" damages assessed against a
ceding company. Thus, in Employers Reinsurance Corporation v.
American Fidelity and Casualty Co., the court has held that unless the
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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terms of the reinsurance agreement or underlying policy provide lor
coverage of "bad faith" damages, a reinsurer will not be liable to its
reinsured for such damages. ^^ in this regard, the Employers court
noted:
Contractually, the reinsurance treaties... do not cover or
deal with a factual situation whereby liability is imposed upon the
reinsurer for the ceding company's "bad faith" or negligent
failure to settle a liability claim within the ambit of the ceding
company's primary policy coverage when the ceding company
has a reasonable opportunity to do so. The reinsurance treaties,
like the primary policies to which they relate, are totally silent
in respect to that matter. That is readily understandable
because the premise for the ceding company's liability... to its
insureds... for sums in excess of its policy coverage, and which it
seeks to here pass on to the reinsurer is one imposed by the law
of torts and not strictly for breach of contract. ^^
The Employers court rejected the ceding company's argument
that the reinsurance agreement created a joint enterprise between the
reinsurer and the ceding company. ^^^ Moreover, since the reinsurance
agreement in question in Employers did not contain a "follow-the -
fortunes"clause, the court also rejected the reinsured's contention that
the reinsurer's liability "follow that of the reinsured in every case. " as a
matter of law.^^
62. See Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co.. 196
F. Supp. 553. 560 (W. D. Mo. 1959)
63. Id.
64. Id. at 561
65. Id. at 560-61
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However, reinsurers may not necessarily be shielded from
liability in every instance in which the reinsurance agreement is silent
with respect to "bad faith' or punitive damages. For example, the
presence of a "follow-the-fortunes" clause in the reinsurance
agreement and a reinsurer's acquiescence in the defense strategy of
the insured may provide a basis for imposing liability on the reinsurer
for "bad faith" damages. ^^
In Peerless Insurance Co. v. Inland Mutual Insurance Co.. an
insured sued its liability insurer for negligence and bad faith in failing
to settle a personal injury action against the insured within the policy
limits. The insurer settled the bad faith action prior to its
adjudication and sought to recover a portion of the cost of settlement
and costs of defense of the bad faith action from its reinsurer. The
reinsurance treaty at issue in Peerless provided that liability of the
Reinsurer shall follow that of the Reinsured in every case..."^"^
Importantly, the reinsurer in Peerless was kept fully informed of
the significant developments in the person injury action and was
"freely and frankly consulted by the reinsured" as to whether to reject
the personal injury plaintiffs offer to settle within the policy limits.es
Further, the reinsurer did not seek to exercise its contractual right to
be associated with the reinsured in the defense or control of the
underlying suit, but "left the decision as to defense and settlement of
the action in the reinsured's hands. "eg
66. Peerless Insurance Co. v. Inland Mutual Insurance Co.. 251 F. 2d 696 (4Lh Cir. 1958)
67. Id. at 697
68. Id. at 702. 704
69. Id. at 703-704
26
The Peerless court thus held that the reinsurer was bound by
the reinsured's settlement decision in the underlying action and
consequently, it was liable for a proportionate share of the settlement
of the "bad faith" action. 70 Contrary to the finding in Employers.? 1 the
Peerless court held that the reinsurer and reinsured in those
circumstances were engaged in a joint enterprise in defending the
underlying action. 72
In Ott V. All-star Ins. Corp. .73 liability has been imposed on a
reinsurer for "bad faith" damages assessed against the ceding company
under an excess-of-policy-limits provision in the reinsurance
agreement. The clause in question in Ott was added in an
endorsement to the original reinsurance agreement and provided that:
Should the Ceding Company become legally obligated to
pay a loss in excess of its policy limits the Reinsurer agrees to
assume seventy-five present of that part of such loss (plus
proportionate loss expense) which is in excess of the policy
limit. However, in the event the applicable policy limit is less
than the Ceding Company's retention at the time of the loss, the
amount hereby assumed by the Reinsurer shall be limited to
seventy-five percent of that part of the loss (plus proportionate
loss expense) which is in excess of said retention. 74
70. Id. at 704
71. Note 62, supra
72. Note 66, supra
73. 299 N.W. 2d 839 (Wise. 1981)
74. Id. at 841
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The clause did not expressly provide coverage for punitive or
extra-contractual damages. The Ott court rejected the reinsurer's
contention that the excess-of-policy-limits clause merely provided for
additional reinsurance. Rather, the clause made the reinsurer the
liability insurer of the ceding company. 75 As such, the excess-of-
policy-limits clause "provided coverage for the ceding company's torts
in connection with its relations with its own insureds. "76 The court
noted that by the terms of the excess-of-policy-limits clause:
The central risk against which the reinsured sought to be
protected was the potential that the company might become
liable in tort to one of its insureds for a bad faith or negligent
failure to settle a claim within policy limits. 77
By interpreting the excess -of-limits provision as constituting
liability insurance rather than reinsurance, the Ott court reversed
the lower court's dismissal of the underlying insured's 'bad faith"
action against the reinsurer under Wisconsin's direct action statute.
The variance in results found in these decisions emphasizes the need
for reinsurers and ceding companies to draft reinsurance agreements
with sufficient specificity so as to spell out their obligations with
respect to extra-contractual damages. 78
The insertion of excess-of-policy-limits clauses like the one in
Ott V. All-star Ins. Corp. ,79 was one attempt to rectify this problem.
Following the uncertainty left by the Employers and Peerless
75. Id. at 844
76. Id. at 848
77. Id. at 846
78. Sullivan. Reinsurance in the Age of Crisis, 38 FICC Q. at 15
79. Note 73 supra
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decisions, many ceding companies sought express contractual
coverage in the form of "excess of policy limits clause" added to
reinsurance agreements to protect themselves against liability for "bad
faith" judgments in excess of policy limits. so Accordingly, reinsurers
should incorporate specific exclusions in their contracts if they do not
intend to cover extra-contractual damages.
E. Primary Carrier's Duty to Excess Carrier
Clearly the new growth and development area for bad faith is in
those disputes between primary and excess insurers. Given the
development of actions for bad faith and disputes between excess and
primary carriers, the question arises whether it can develop within
disputes between the primary insurer and its reinsurer. Because the
duty of good faith and the statutory remedies have subjected primary
insurers to awards of extra-contractual damages, the question
necessarily arises as to the excess carrier's responsibility when the
monies awarded to the insured exceed the primary carrier's limits of
liability. While the primary carrier looks to the excess carrier for any
judgment amount in excess of the primary limits, the excess carrier
frequently feels that the primary carrier mishandled the claim or
wrongly failed to settle, resulting in a judgment in excess of the
primary carrier's limits. In these situations, excess carriers have
sought to impose liability back upon the primary carrier and avoid
extra payment.
80. 299 N.W. 2d at 845
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1. Actions Constituting Bad Faith
Because there appears to be a cause of action by aii excess
carrier against the primary insurer, primary carriers must be
especially cognizant of what constitutes bad faith. Basically, that which
constitutes bad faith from the primary carrier to the insured
constitutes bad faith to the excess carrier. However, there do seem to
be some instances in which actions which would not constitute bad
faith to the insured can constitute or at least contribute to a finding of
bad faith to the excess carrier. si
The question that has occasionally arisen is whether a primary
insurer's request or demand for contribution from its insured or the
excess carrier is evidence of bad faith. This question becomes
particularly acute where a settlement demand is within the primaiy
carrier's policy limits, but the primary carrier uses the possibility of an
excess judgment as leverage against the excess carrier. In Centennial
Insurance Co. v. Liability Mutual Ins. Co., 82 it was held that an attempt
to induce an insured or its excess carrier to contribute to settlement
can be evidence be bad faith, but that an attempt does not mandate a
finding of bad faith. Further, whether such an action constitutes bad
faith must be viewed and considered in light of the surrounding
circumstances. The court held that the request for contribution did
not constitute bad faith as the parties had negotiated in good faith and
the request for contribution from the excess carrier was the
81. Paul B. BuUer, Jr. and Robert v. Potter, Jr., The Primary' Carrier CaughUn The
Middle With Bad Faith Exposure To Its Insureds, Excess Carriers and Reinsurers. 24
Tort & Insurance L^w Journal at 126
82. 404 N. E. 2d 759 (Ohio)
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difference between the primary carrier's highest offer and claimant's
lowest offer.
During the course of discussing whether an excess carrier can
sue a primary carrier for recovery of an excess judgment, many courts
have discussed the concepts of negligence and. therefore, many
decisions can be found in which primary insurers are seemingly found
liable to the excess carrier on the basis of negligent acts. However,
the correct legal principles can only support liability where the
primary carrier acts intentionally or with a very high degree of
negligence such that its conduct can be considered grossly negligent
or wanton and malicious. 83
For instance, in Centennial Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. ,84 a verdict was rendered which was $495,000 in excess of
primary limits. While the primary carrier had offered to settle for
$250,000 the claimant's lowest demand had been $275,000 and the
primary carrier requested contribution from the excess carrier in an
amount equal to the difference. Although the ultimate judgment was
far in excess of policy limits, it was held that the primary carrier was
not guilty of bad faith in that the difference between the settlement
offer and the ultimate judgment was simply a mistake in judgment and
evaluation.
For the most part, those cases which seem to hold that a
primary carrier can be held liable for negligent acts involve situations
where the handing of settlement negotiation and defense tactics ai"e
best described as nonresponsive or obviously unreasonable. In Peter v.
83. Paul B. Bulter, Jr. and Robert v. Potter, Jr.. note 77 supra, at 127
84. 404 N.E. 2d 759 (Ohio 1980)
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Traveler Ins. Co. .as trial resulted in a judgment and ultimate
settlement in the amount of $387.984. 10. While the primary insurer
carried limits of $250,000 it refused an offer to settle within policy
limits and offered only $150,000 to settle the case. The $150,000
offer was maximum authority held by the branch office and a
breakdown in communications with the home office prevented any
additional authority from ever being extended. This unresponsive
conduct was held to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
Likewise, bad faith or liability for excess judgments frequently occurs
where the primary insurer simply fails to conduct an appropriate
investigation or to provide a reasonable evaluation of the injuries.
The evaluation by the company's or insured's lawyer that policy
limits will be exceeded, is in and of itself insufficient to constitute bad
faith, but it is generally admissible and oftentimes substantial evidence
of bad faith. 86 It has likewise been held that a refusal to settle or pay a
claim upon the basis of advice of counsel cannot prevent a finding of
bad faith. 87 However, where the recovery of punitive damages are
sought, advice of counsel can be shown to rebut the applicability of
punitive damages or in mitigation. ss Furthermore, where malice is an
essential element of the claim for bad faith, reliance upon advice of
counsel may constitute a complete defense. 89
85. 375 F. Supp. 10347 (C. D. CaJ. 1974)
86. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. De La Maza. 328 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
87. Flynn V. NaUonwlde Mut. Ins. Co. , 315 S.E. 2d 817 (S. C. 1984)
88. Wagenheim V.Alexander Grant & Co., 482 N.E.. 2d 955 (Ohio App. 1983)
89. Brownlee v. Pratt. 68 N. E. 2d 789 (Ohio App. 1946)
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2. Avoid Bad Faith Exposure to Excess Carrier
Essentially, the steps that the primary carrier takes to avoid bad
faith exposure to its insured are the same steps to be taken with
respect to the excess carrier. However, because some courts are
beginning to develop a direct fiduciary duty owed by the primary
carrier to the excess carrier, there are some additional considerations
which primary carriers must take.
As is the case with the insured, the primary insurer should give
notice to the excess carrier of all significant developments and
particularly of all settlement offers. The primary carrier should also
strive to be particularly responsive to all questions and requests made
by the excess carrier and should seek to make a full disclosure of all
facts known. In several bad faith actions it has been noted as a matter
of significance in favor of the primary carrier that the primary carrier
was willing to open its claim file to the excess carrier during the
course of litigation and settlement negotiations. While it may be
tempting for excess carriers to note in their files the obvious exposure
to and probability of an excess judgment, if they note these matters
without fully reviewing the information possessed by the primary
carrier, their statements will carry substantially less weight and will
have tlie appearance of being self-serving. Such self-serving
comments or correspondence can actually operate to the detriment of
both the primary and excess carrier, particularly if they are discovered
by the claimant's attorney who then realizes that his bargaining
position is enhanced. While there are no existing cases in which the
theory has been argued, the potential exists for the primaty carrier to
seek reimbursement from the excess carrier for the amount by which
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the excess carrier's self-serving statements served to increase tlie
ultimate settlement value of the case. Obviously, there is a potential
for abuse on both the side of the primary carrier and the excess
carrier. The clear message from the courts is that they will seek to
eliminate these abuses by allowing the primary and excess carriers to
recover from the one most responsible.
Perhaps the most important step that a primary carrier can take
in avoiding exposure to the excess carrier is to make and document
realistic assessments of the potential judgment. As discussed above,
careful analysis of legal principles and existing case law does not
support the primary carrier's liability for bad faith based upon
incorrect evaluations and good faith under assessments of the ultimate
judgment. Accordingly, if the primary insurer can establish that its
evaluations of the potential judgment were reasonable and based upon
valid considerations, its chances of avoiding liability for an excess
judgment substantially improve. To the extent that there is data or
specific examples that support the primary carrier's evaluation of the
loss, those should be included within the claim file and should also be
disclosed to both the insured and excess carrier. Consideration can be
given in the appropriate case to the possibility of obtaining the opinion
of an outside consultant.
Liability for an excess judgment will not be imposed upon the
primary carrier because it was unable to reach a consensus with the
insured and excess carrier, but only if its assessment is deemed
unreasonable or in bad faith. Moreover, by disclosing the basis for the
primary carrier's assessments, the excess carrier may implicitly
accept those bases unless it refutes them with other substantive
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information. This exchange can only create additional information
upon which assessment can be made. There has been considerable
discussion as to whether the primary insurer must subordinate its best
interests to that of the insured or the excess carrier. The case law
only rarely states that a primary insurer must subordinate its own
interests. Rather, the majority rule seems to be that the primary
carrier must only give good faith consideration to the insured's or the
excess carrier's interest. Some courts have specifically stated that if
there is any factual basis for den3ang liability, the carrier is privileged
to litigate its liability without fear of "bad faith. "90 Accordingly, the
primary insurer is entitled to consider its own interests, but it simply
cannot place its own interests ahead of its insureds or of the excess
carriers. The ultimate test of bad faith seems to be that set forth in
Continental Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 91
cind Crisci v. Security Ins. Co, 92 in which the courts held that the test
of bad faith was whether an insurer without policy limits would have
accepted the settlement offer. This test can be expanded to cover all
situations by asking whether the steps taken by the insurer would have
been taken had the matter been exclusively within the control of an
insured with the financial resources sufficient to satisfy any possible
judgment.
90. Tyson v. Safe Co Ins. Co., 461 So. 2d 1308 (Ala. 1984) Hyiggins v. Blue Cross of W.
Iowa, 319 N. W. 2d 232 (Iowa 1982) Hoskins v. Aetna Life Co.. 452 N. E. 2d 1315 (Ohio
1983)
91. 516 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
92. 426 P. 2d 173 (Cal. 1963)
CHAPTER 2
Issues of Insolvency
The economic turmoil in the international insurance and
reinsurance markets has ensured that a significant number of insurers
and reinsurers have recently become insolvent. When an insurer
becomes insolvent, its assets must be liquidated in accordance with
state statutes. This chapter concentrates on what would happen if a
reinsured were unable to pay claims made upon it.
A. The Insolvency Clause
A reinsurance agreement is one by which the reinsurer
indemnify the ceding company for losses paid. The insolvency clause
is a contractual exception to the indemnity nature of the reinsurance
agreement. The insolvency clause allows the liquidator or receiver of
the insolvent insurer to collect from the reinsurer the amount that
would have been due if the ceding company had not become insolvent
and had paid the claim. As a result of the indemnity nature of the
contract, it is a constant and uniform principle of law in this country
that the original insured cannot enforce an insurer's contract of
reinsurance and is not a third-party beneficiary to that contract.
Therefore, no privity exists between the reinsurer and the insured or
persons claiming through him, under or by reason of the contract of
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reinsurance.^^ Claimants to reinsurance assets have no common law or
statutory right unless the reinsurance agreement so provide.
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pink. ^"^ the primary insured was
insolvent and the quota share reinsurer contended that the contract
was one of indemnity which required that reinsurer reimburse the
liquidator only for the appropriate proportion of the losses actually
paid by the liquidator to claimants. The liquidator contended that he
should be reimbursed the appropriate proportion of the primary
company's liability to claimants regardless of the amount the insolvent
company was able to pay the claimants. Based on the language of the
reinsurance agreement, the Supreme Court found for the reinsurer.
Since Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pink, regulators have initiated
legislation to assure that reinsurers would pay reinsurance proceeds
based on the total liabilities of the insolvent company rather than on
the total payment to claimants. Subsequent to the Fidelity & Deposit
Co. V. Pink decision, regulators sought statutory means of requiring
that in the event of the insolvency of a primary company, reinsurers
would be obligated to pay reinsurance proceeds based on the liability
of the ceding company, as determined in the liquidation proceeding,
notwithstanding the indemnity nature of the reinsurance contract. At
the prompting of state insurance departments, most states have
adopted statutes, regulations, rules or practices that prohibit credit
for reinsurance unless the reinsurance agreement contains a provision
stating that in the event of the insolvency of the ceding company, the
93. Couch on Insurance, 2d. 80 at 66; Nutter. Reinsurance Issues in Lhe liquidaUon of
Insolvent Insurers. 18 Forum 290, 291. (1983)
94. 302 U. S. 224(1937)
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reinsurer shall pay reinsurance proceeds to the domiciliary liquidator
based on the liability of the ceding company, as established in the
liquidation proceeding, regardless of whether or not the liquidator can
pay fully such liability. ^^
The effect of such statutes has been to require an "insolvency
clause" in reinsurance agreements. Without such a clause, the ceding
company would not be able to take credit for the reinsurance in its
statutory financial statements, which is an important reason for the
acquisition of reinsurance. ^^ The effect of the insolvency clause is to
preserve the assets of the estate of the insolvent company.
95. See the Model Insolvency statute recommended by the Reinsurance Association ol'
America:
No credit shall be allowed, as an admitted asset or deduction from liability, to any
ceding insurer for reinsurance, unless the reinsurance contract provides, in substance.
that in the event of the insolvency of the ceding insurer, the reinsurance shall be
payable under contract or contracts reinsured by the assuming insurer on the basis of
the claims allowed against the ceding insurer in the insolvency proceedings, without
diminution because of the insolvency of the ceding insurer, directly to the ceding
insurer or to its domiciliary liquidator or receive except: (a) where the contract
specifically provides another payee of such reinsurance in the event of the insolvency
of the ceding insurer or (b) where the assuming insurer with the consent of the direct
insured or insureds has assumed such policy obligations of the ceding insurer as direct
obligations of the assuming insurer to the payees under such policies and in
substitution for the obligations of the ceding insurer to such payees.
The domiciliary liquidator or receiver of an insolvent ceding insurer shall give
written notice of the pendent of a claim against such ceding insurer on the conLracl
reinsured within a reasonable time after such claim is filed in the insolvency
proceeding. During the pendent of such claim is to be adjudicated any defenses which it
deems available to the ceding insurer, its liquidator or receiver. Such expense shall be
chargeable subject to court approval against the insolvent ceding insurer as part of the
expense of liquidation to the extent of a proportionate share of the benefit which may
accrue to the ceding insurer solely as a result of the defense undertaken by the assuming
insurer. Where two or more assuming insurers are involved in the same claim and a
majority in interest elect to interpose defense to such claim, the expense shall be
apportioned in accordance with the terms of the reinsurance agreement as though such
expense had been incurred by the ceding company.
96. Skandia Am. Reins. Co. v. Schenk, 441 F.Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
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B. The Relationship Between Reinsurance Proceeds And State
Guaranty Funds
The creation of the insurance guaranty associations in the early
1970s has resulted in considerable litigation involving reinsurance and
insolvent insurers. These guaranty funds assume the obligations of an
insolvent company to its insureds by fulfilling the policy obligations of
the insurer up to a statutory limit. After the claims of policyholders
are paid, the fund, like other creditors, is reimbursed from the assets
of the insolvent company in accordance with statutory priorities.
The primary argument advanced by the funds is that they are the
"statutory successor" to the insolvent company and. by reason of the
insolvent's reinsurance contracts, are entitled to direct payment of
reinsurance proceeds. In response, reinsurers have complied with
the widely used standard insolvency clause contained in most
reinsurance contracts which requires payment to the "liquidator,
receiver or statutory successor" upon the insolvency of the reinsured.
The funds have relied on language in their enabling legislation
"deeming" them to be the insurer to the extent of the insolvent's
obligations. The courts have rejected this interpretation and have
instead construed it as a limitation on the funds' authority. In Skandia
America Reinsurance Corp. v. Schench. Superintendent of Insurance.^'
it was held that the deeming language was a limitation on the funds'
general obligations to pay covered claims. The courts have held that
the language merely meant that the fund could assert all the rights and
policy defenses available to the insurer in fulfilling its obligation. ^^
97. 441 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
98. General Reinsurance Corp. v. Missouri Gen. Ins. Co.. 458 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1977)
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The major reason for the rejection of the "statutory successor"
argument is its direct and irreconcilable conflict with the remainder
of the liquidation scheme. Related code provisions endow only the
domiciliary liquidator with authority to administer the estate aiid
gamer all assets, which include reinsurance proceeds. More
troublesome is the statutory priority accorded the funds in the
distribution of these assets. Where the statute expressly gives the fund
the position of a fifth-level creditor, it is incongruous to provide it
with a means to bypass the entire process. In sum. granting the fund
such a preference does violence to the remainder of the liquidation
law.99
Equitable theories of recovery have been advanced but have
received even less consideration. Funds contend that they are
equitably subrogated to the rights of the policyholder, whose claims
they have paid. Although this is true, it does not follow that the fund
has a right of action against the reinsurer. In Excess and Casualty
Reinsurance Association v. Insurance Comm'r of California, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "Because a claimant has no rights
against the reinsurance company, neither does the Guaranty
Association in the claimant's shoes." ^°°
Lastly, the funds have maintain that public policy entitles them
to the direct payment of reinsurance proceeds. The funds have argued
that it is necessary to protect the public and keep policyholder
premiums from increasing to cover fund assessments on insurers.
Both arguments are too narrow in vision. The funds are only a small
99. Skandia Am. Reinsurance corp. v. Schench. 441 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
100. 656 F. 2d at 496.
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part of a liquidation process that attempts to balance the needs of
multiple parties. Public policy requires tliat this balance, achieved
through a careful procedure and priority system, be enforced. A
guaranty fund exception to this system would benefit one creditor at
the expense of many others and disrupt a distribution process upon
which all creditors rely for prompt payment. '°'
The legal challenges brought by guaranty funds seeking direct
payment of reinsurance proceeds outside the liquidation process have
resulted in the reaffirmation of established principles of insurance law.
Notwithstanding the public service which the guaranty funds perform,
they also have prompted a restatement of support for the uniform
liquidation of insurers.
From their viewpoint reinsurers have comprehensive judicial
support for the integrity of reinsurance contract clauses denying third
party rights in the contracts and for compliance with insolvency clause
requirements to pay proceeds to statutory liquidators. State insurance
officials as receivers will receive reinsurance contract proceeds in a
manner consistent with the treatment of reinsurance as a general
asset for the reduction in liabilities on financial statements. Lastly.
guaranty funds can pursue reinsurance proceeds within the
receivership as an early source of funds available for the payment of
claims and to relieve the burden of assessments. '°2
101. Supra note at 495.
102. Nutter, Insurance Insolvencies, Guaranty Funds, and Reinsurance Proceeds. 29 Fed.
Ins. Coun.Q.373( 1979)
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C. Exceptions to the Insolvency Clause
The New York statute requires that insolvency clauses state that
the reinsurance proceeds need not be payable to the liquidator where
the reinsurance agreement specifies another payee of such
reinsurance in the event of the insolvency of the ceding insurer;
and the assuming insurer with the consent of the di) ect insureds, has
assumed such policy obligations to the payees as a replacement for the
obligations of the ceding insurer. ^°3
The first exception noted above allows an endorsement to the
reinsurance agreement called the cut-through endorsement. A cut-
through endorsement to a reinsurance contract allows payment of
reinsurance proceeds directly to the original insured in the event of
the ceding company's insolvency. A cut-through endorsement used by
one reinsurer provides:
In the event [the ceding company] fails to pay, within the
time provided in the above identified policy, any loss thereunder
for which [the ceding company] is legally liable, [the reinsurer]
for value received agrees hereby that it will immediately
become liable for 100 percent of said loss and will make
payment thereof at once directly to the parties named in said
policy, or otherwise as their respective interest may appear.
The undersigned covenant that this agreement takes
precedence over any other reinsurance agreement, contract or
arrangement between them to the extent that [the reinsurer]
shall not be subject to duplicate liability because of any
103. 1308 (2)(B)(i) and (ii) of the N.Y. Ins. Code.
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payments made under the terms hereof.
[The reinsurer] reserves the right to cancel this
agreement upon notice to the parties named in the above
identified policy as required by the policy.'^'*
Typically, this endorsement is requested by a mortgagee or
insured who is not satisfied with the financial rating of the ceding
company. The cut-through endorsement merely redirects to the
insured or mortgagee reinsurance proceeds otherwise payable to the
liquidator, pursuant to the insolvency clause, in the event of the
insolvency of the ceding company. A cut-through is not technically a
novation, substituting the reinsurer for the insurer on the original
policy, nor is it an assumption certificate whereby the reinsurer
assumes all policy obligations of the insurer and. thus, relieves it
completely.
Some regulators have questioned the use of the cut-through
endorsement because it gives a preference in liquidation to the
beneficiaries of the endorsement and is unfair to other claimants who
receive a lesser portion of their claims when assets are distributed. In
1977 the largest insurer in Puerto Rico was declared insolvent.
Subsequent events identified several reinsurers which had issued cut-
through endorsements. Arguments were made that traditional
principles of reinsurance law were applicable and that the reinsurance
due the insolvent was a general asset of the estate payable solely to the
insurance commissioner. It was asserted that, for public policy
reasons, the cut-through did not survive the insolvency of the insurer.
104. Donald W. Reese And Carol E Reese, Reinsurance: The Basic and Bad Faith
ConsideraUons. 39 Fed'n Ins & Corp. Coun. Q 1990 at 337
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The Superior Court found, however, that the cut-throughs survived tlie
insolvency and that the reinsurers were directly liable to policyholders
holding valid endorsements. The court also relieved the guaranty fund
of its obligation to pay where a valid cut-tlirough was issued to the
policyholder.
A variation of the cut-through endorsement is the guarantee
endorsement whereby the reinsurer, in the event of insolvency,
guarantees payment of some or all of the primary company's
obligations. When Best's ratings decline, many primary companies
request cut-through and guarantee endorsements or bonds from
reinsurers. Given the administrative problems attendant to such
endorsements, regulatory disfavor and the credit risk, many
reinsurers restrict the use of these endorsements.
Another exception to the New York statute requiring an
insolvency clause for reinsurance credit is the assumption
agreement. 1°^ This usually takes the form of a novation by which one
company agrees to assume the obligations and liabilities of the original
insurer to the insured, i.e., replaces the original insurer. The original
insurer is released from its liabilities to the insured. In order for
there to be a true novation, the insured must consent to the
substitution of insurers since the insured's right to choose an insurer
is impacted.
It may be questioned whether the assumption agreement truly is
a reinsurance transaction since it involves replacement of insurers
rather than a traditional transfer of a portion of a risk from an insurer
105. See 1 1 14 (c) of the N.Y. Ins. Code.
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to a reinsurer. Nonetheless, the form of such a transaction is usually
that of an assumption and reinsurance of certain obligations for
specified consideration.
Aside from the three abovementioned exceptions to the
insolvency clause, there may exist an extra contractual obligation
clause in a reinsurance agreement which may not be reinsurance and,
therefore, may not fall within the ambit of the insolvency clause. An
extra contractual obligation arises separately from tlie coverage of any
insurance policy reinsured and results from tortious conduct of the
insurer in the course of policyholder service or claim handling
pursuant to such insurance policy. An excess judgment, a type of extra
contractual obligation, is a loss in excess of the policy limit, the
insurer being liable for such excess due to mishandling of the claim.
Extra contractual obligations may include both compensatory and
punitive damages.
D. Direct Action
Where a primary insurance company becomes insolvent, claim
pajonents cease for the period of time necessary for the liquidator to
take control and for the guaranty funds to obtain and review the claim
files. Thereafter, payment of claims becomes problematical. A
guaranty fund uall pay a claim which falls within the lines of business
and limits stated in the fund's enabling legislation. Those claims not
paid at all or in full by the guaranty fund are referred to the liquidator.
The public depends on insurance to fund its personal and business
losses. When an insurance company is unable to so fund losses due to
insolvency, insureds experience a serious economic inconvenience.
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For this reason, some insureds and claimants seek to collect
reinsurance proceeds directly from reinsurers.
Direct actions undercut the statutory scheme of liquidation
adopted in most states '^^ and are contrary to the indemnity nature of
the reinsurance contract. As a result, a body of case law has developed
which demonstrates that absent an intent to benefit directly or create
rights in insureds or other third parties, reinsurance proceeds are
payable only to the domiciliary liquidator. The bases upon which the
courts have reached this conclusion are explored below.
1. Direct Action Claims by Insureds and Claimants
a. Agency Relationship
A novel approach to avoid the liquidation estate of an insolvent
insurer is the argument that the insurer is merely the agent of the
reinsurer. Under this theory the reinsurer becomes liable to the
claimant outside and independent of the liquidation proceedings. To
succeed on this legal theory, a claimant must overcome considerable
legal precedent: the indemnity nature of the reinsurance contract and
lack of privity with the insurer. The traditional and stated reason to
deny direct actions against reinsurers is the lack of privity with the
reinsurer. An insured or claimant is not a party to the reinsurance
agreement and the insured does not enter into an insurance contract
106. The NAIC Insurers supervision. Rehabililation, and Liquidation Model Act. in 1 (d)
(3) and (4), states as purpose of the act " enhanced sulTiciency and economy of
hquidation" and "equitable apportionment of any unavoidable loss." The liquidator is
directed to marshall and preserve the assets of the insolvent insurer [21 (A)(6)l and
reduce the assets to a degree of liquidity necessary for distribution 125(B)]. Claims and
other debts are paid out based on a specific priority[421 which assures equal treatment
within the classes of priorities.
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based on knowledge of the reinsurance obtained by the insurer. Tlie
reinsurance agreement is one by which the assuming company
indemnifies the ceding company for a portion of the paid loss. The
reinsurer does not assume the ceding company's liability.
The law in the United States has traditionally held that persons
not party to the reinsurance agreement have no privity to the
reinsurer. Thus, it comes as a novel proposition that a primary insurer
may. by reason of the reinsurance contract, be an agent of its
reinsurers. The courts of the United States which have addressed the
insurer-reinsurer relationship have generally refused to embrace such
a legal conclusion, ^o^
The rationale for finding no agency is as follows:
If privity between the reinsurer and the insured, parties
claiming directly against the reinsurer cannot be established,
a principal/agent relationship between the reinsurer and the
primary insurer or its employees also cannot be established.
The earliest of the federal appellate courts addressing this issue
stated the plaintiffs claim as follows: 'The grounds which the plaintiffs
rest their rights to recover against the reinsurers are ... (i) that the
reinsurers, through the surety company {the primary company) as
their agent, entered into contractual relationships with the use-
plaintiffs when it undertook... to pay for the labor and materials
107. See Aetna v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.. 453 F. 2d 686 (5th Cir. 1972) A/S Ivarans Rederic v.
Puerto Rico ports Auth.. 617 F. 2d 946 (4Lh Cir. 1934) Employers Reins. Corp. v. Am.
Fidelity and Casualty. 196 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1959)
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supplied." '0" The court found, notwithstanding tlie direct paynicnl of a
claim by the reinsurer, no agency existed:
It is true that the reinsurance agreements authorized the surety
company to act for the reinsurers in all matters arising in
connection with any claim, and to take any action in regard
thereto which it might deem advisable; its decision or
settlement to be final and conclusive and unconditionally binding
upon the reinsurers. These provisions of the reinsurance
agreements seem to have been designed with relation to the
parties thereto, so that the liability of the reinsurers to the
surety company would not be diminished or adversely affected by
any arrangement in the nature of a settlement or compromise
which the surety company might make with the claimants; and
it does not appear from the facts alleged that the reinsuring
companies became parties to any contract between the surety
company and the materialmen for the completion of the work.'o^
Similarly, in the case of Aetna Insurance Co. v. Glens Falls
Insurance Co., ^^o the court stated the issue before the court to be as
follows:" The appeal involves the existence of an agency relationship
between two reinsurers and an employee of the reinsured." The
employee in that case was an underwriter. The court's rejection of
such a principal-agent relationship is as follows:
The district court's analysis of the transaction portrayed Palmer
(the insurer's employee) as wearing two hats at the same time.
108. United States, to use of Colonial Brick Corp. v. Federal Sur. Co.. 72 F. 2d 946 (4th
Cir. 1934)
109. Id at 968
1 10. 453 F.2d 687 (5th Cir 1972)
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i.e., as acting for tlie reinsured in ceding Ihe reinsurMiice and at
t±ie same time acting for the reinsurers in accepting the
reinsurance. This misconstrues the nature of the reinsured and
the reinsurers. The reinsurance treaties, and not Palmer, bound
the reinsurers."^
In Safeway Trails. Ins. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co..'^^ d^q ccjrt
expressly found that, despite representations by the primary
company's agent regarding the reinsurance and the reliance upon
those representations by the insured, the agents of the primary
company "were not agents of the reinsurers and had no authority to
speak for them.'
If no privity between the reinsurers and any party other than tlie
original insurer existed as a matter of law. the cases conclude that no
agency relationship could exist between the employees of the primar>^
company and the reinsurers. There are three elements necessary to
establish agency. The first is the autliority of the reinsurer to control
the actions and representations of the employees of the primary
company. Under the normal operation of reinsurance agreements, the
reinsurer could not dictate, deny, or control the claims practices of
the primary company. By the terms of the contract, the reinsurer is
bound economically for settlements made within the underlying policy
and the coverage of the treaty.
The second element of agency is the power of the agent to alter
legal relationships between the principal and third parties. The cases
are overwhelmingly clear that no privity exists between the reinsurer
111. Id. at 290
112. 21 1 F. Supp. 227, 233 (M.D.N.C. 1962)
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and any tJiird party and t±iat the contract remains one purely ol
indemnity unless it expressly provides otherwise. In most reinsurance
relationships the employees of the primary company have no power to
unilaterally alter the legal relationship of the reinsurer to any party.
Lastly, the law of agency says that apparent authority is
dependent upon a factual showing that the third party relied upon the
misrepresentation of the alleged agent because of some misleading
conduct on the part of the principal and not the agent. Where the
record is devoid of any evidence that the reinsurers took any
affirmative action which would have misled the third parties involved,
no agency can be established. The apparent authority for which the
principal may be held liable must be traceable to him; it cannot be
established by the unauthorized acts, representations, or conduct of
the agent. 1 '3
b. Unfair Claims Practices Act
In Royal Globe v. Superior Court of Butte County.""* the court
created a right of recovery for a third -party claimant against the
insurer of the negligent party based solely on a state Unfair Claims
Practices Act. The decision has been widely reported and insurers
have become increasingly subjected to Royal Globe-type causes of
action in California and many other states.
The California Supreme Court held in Royal Globe that a suit
against a liability insurer could be maintained only after the cause
action between the injured party and the insured was concluded.
Then a cause in tort for violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act
1 13. 2 N.Y. Jur. Agency 89 at 253.
1 14. 153 Cal. Rptr. 842. 592 P.2d 329 (1979)
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was permissible and was not dependent on any express or implied
contractual duty on the part of the insurer to settle with the insured
or the claimant, i.e., no privity of contract between the claimant and
the insurer was necessary.
The legal theory upon which a reinsurer's liability could exist
under the Unfair Claims Practices Act is not apparent, since by the
terms of most reinsurance agreements the primary insurer remains
singularly responsible for claims matters. The argument for such
liability is based on the assumption that the Act applies to trade
practices of "insurers." which encompasses reinsurers, and
"insurance" which includes reinsurance. Furthermore, the argument
follows, the cause of action is based on a statutory duty not arising in
contract and not excusable by contract. Thus, statutes and case law to
the effect that the original insured has no interest in a contract of
reinsurance are irrelevant for Royal Globe-type claims because these
claimants are third parties, not insureds, and contractual interests are
unnecessary predicates to enforce statutory duties.
The reinsurer's response to this demand is sound in law and
reinsurance practice. To establish the tort the claimant must first
establish the duty owed him. The Royal Globe decision did not
establish new duties, it established a new right of enforcement. If, as
is true under most reinsurance contracts, the reinsured remained
singularly responsible for the defense and settlement of policyholder
claims, the reinsurer had no right to direct claims or actively
manipulate a claim decision. The reinsurer then would not come
within the purview of the Act since the reinsurer was not in privity
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with any party other than the reinsured. No duty to the insured or
claimant exists and Royal Globe creates no civil liability."^
c. Third -Party Beneficiary
In limited situations case law recognizes third -party beneficiary
theories of recovery. The general rule holds that a contracting party,
such as the insured, must have intended the third party to benefit
from the contract at the time of formation. ^^"^ The intent to benefit
may be shown by express contract language covering the third party,
or by a special relationship between the insured and third party, such
as a familiar one. establishing an implied intent to benefit."'' Whether
express or implied, this intent to benefit must be clearly shov/n.
Insureds and claimants have contended that they should be able
to recover directly from the reinsurer as the third-party beneficiaries
of the reinsurance agreement. However, the reinsurance contract
gives indemnity rights to the reinsured but not to an unintended third
party beneficiary. Moreover, statutes deny privity between the insured
and the reinsurer. This theory has been thus far ineffective . The
courts have also ruled that the insureds and claimants are not third-
party beneficiaries of the reinsurance relationship."^
2. Direct Actions by Guaranty Funds
A number of guaranty funds have attempted to collect
reinsurance proceeds directly from reinsurers on the bases that the
1 15. Franklin W. Nutter. Reinsurance Issues In The Liquidation of Insolvent Insurers. 1
8
Forum at 305
116. Murphy V. Allstate Insurance Co., 17 Cal. App. 3d 937
117. Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau, 15 Cal. App. 3d
399(1975)
1 18. United States v. Fed. Surety Company, 72 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1934) Am. Re-Ins. Co. v.
Ins. Comm'r. 527 F. Supp. 444 (CD. Cal. 1981)
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guaranty fund is the statutory successor to the insolvent company or
that they are the third -party beneficiaries of the reinsurance
agreement. However, the courts have rejected such attempts.''^
119. The domiciliary liquidator is the statutory successor to the insolvent insurance
company. SkandiaAm. Rein.s. Corp. v. Barnes. 458 F. Supp. 13 (D. Col. 1978)
The guaranty fund is not the third-parly beneficiary of the reinsurance agreement. Gen.
Reins. Corp. v. Mo. Gen.. 458 F. Supp. 1{W.D. Mo. 1977)
CHAPTER 3
Institutional Approaches to Insurer Insolvency and Reinsurer's
Liability
The fundamental purpose of reinsurance is to spread the risk of
loss. As explained by the Reinsurance Association of America:
Reinsurance enhances the universal risks spreading objectives
of insurance. Reinsurance is purchased by an insurer for one or
more of the following reasons:
1. To reduce their net exposure to liability on particular risks....
2. To protect against accumulations of losses arising out of
catastrophes....
3. To reduce total liabilities to a level appropriate to their
premium volume and capital....
4. To reduce exposure to certain (possibly more hazardous) lines
of business or to alter their "mix" of business....
5. To help stabilize overall operating results....
6. To obtain assistance with new concepts and lines of
insurance....
However, the international insurance and reinsurance markets
are in the grip of a recurrent insurance and reinsurance coverage and
solvency crisis. It has been suggested that the current crisis is a
painful but inevitable and necessary economic correction of the
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industry's recent mismanagement and bad judgment.'-^" However, it is
the issue of insurer and reinsurer insolvency- a painful byproduct of
the crisis that makes the crisis a problem of subtle complexity and
long-term concern.
Generally, when an insurer becomes insolvent, its assets must be
liquidated in accordance with state statutes. In the usual proceeding,
a state insurance administrator will apply to a state court for an order
of liquidation. If the court orders liquidation, it will have exclusive
jurisdiction of any claims made against the insolvent insurer. The
administrator then liquidates the insurer for the benefit of all its
creditors, including its reinsurers, subject to their proofs of claims.
Clearly, it behooves reinsurers to closely monitor ceding companies in
regard to solvency.
The recent economic turmoil in the international insurance and
reinsurance markets has forced to the surface legal issues and
ambiguities that are increasingly exploited by market participants in
order to deny or avoid payment. It has been reported that 79
American companies were placed in involuntary rehabilitation between
1984 and 1986 and that 811 companies were on the national
Association of Insurance Commissioners' list "for regulatory attention.
"
However, the insurance trade press is filled with dire analyses of
perceived inadequacies in the state insurance regulatory system in the
United States. Some analysts have estimated that 10 percent to 20
percent of the $70 billion of reinsurance that should be recoverable
will not be collected. The increasing rate of insolvencies and a
120. Teff. Alarm from London. Brief, Fall 1985, at 17
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domino effect of ineffective rehabilitations and liquidaliuns could block
increasing amounts of the cash flow in the insurance and reinsurance
market. This would increase the actual size of the reinsurance
collections problems.
Although the relationship between the parties to a reinsurance
contract is an exercise of fiduciary responsibility to each other,
disputes arise as in any commercial endeavor. However, the parties to
reinsurance contracts have resorted first to negotiation as the
optimum solution. Where that fails contracts commonly require the
parties to arbitrate their differences. Arbitration is viewed as no
substitute for negotiation but instead as a means to preserve the
relationship without sacrificing a company's ability to resolve a matter
of fundamental principle. Where all else fails, the parties to a
reinsurance contract may litigate. Most of the litigation that has risen
has been between reinsurers and persons not party to the agreement.
Perhaps most notable is litigation prompted by the insolvency of a
party to the reinsurance agreement. From the foregoing, it is clear
that the reinsurance industry is in need of aid to fight against the
obstacles it faces in overcoming the effects of reinsurance crises.
A review of litigation stemming from the insolvency of insurers
reveals that several very basic reinsurance-related issues are well
settled. Principal among them is that reinsurance is an idemnity
relationship in which persons not party to the reinsurance agreement
have no interest and or privy. The insolvency of the reinsured does
not affect this fundamental premise.
The best protection for reinsurers from the dangers of insurer
insolvency has come through governmental regulations. However, as
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one commentator said, reinsurance and insolvency law and practice in
our intertwined jurisdictions lack and must develop a soundly
reasoned and compatible framework, which enforce the morality of
utmost good faith, if we are to prevent economic and legal chaos in the
international insurance and reinsurance markets and the balkanized
courts. ^21
A. Arbitration
Virtually all reinsurance agreements will involve interstate
commerce and thereby fail under the Federal Arbitration Act ("the
Act"). ^22 The ^ct provides that written provisions for arbitration of
future disputes in commercial or maritime transactions are valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable. '^3 The principal objective of the statute
is to enforce private agreements to arbitrate. While arbitrability of
disputes involving domestic transactions is governed by Chapter 1 of
the Act, arbitration in international transactions is governed by the
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards as implemented by Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. '24
Further, an action or proceeding falling under the Convention is
deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States and
the district courts of the United States are deemed to have original
jurisdiction over such proceedings without regard to the amount in
controversy.
121. John Milligan-Wbyte and Mary Cannon Veed. Bermudian, English And American
Reinsurance Arbitration Law And Practice And Alternative Dispute Resolution
Methods, 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal at 122.
122. 9 U.S.C. 2
123. 9 U.S.C. 201-207(1986)
124. Id.
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The Act requires a federal court, when faced witli an action to
stay litigation pending arbitration or compel arbitration, to make only
three determinations. The first step is the jurisdictionaJ inquiry
whether the subject matter of arbitration involves either a maritime
transaction or a transaction in interstate commerce. If either of these
alternative requirements is present, the court must then determine
whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. If a valid agreement is
found, the court must finally determine whether the particular dispute
is arbitrable, i.e., whether the parties intended the disputes be
arbitrated. Hence, while the court may examine issues concerning the
making and performance of the arbitration agreement, it may not
analyze the merits of the underlying dispute. '^s Although the scope of
judicial involvement in the arbitral process has been narrowly
circumscribed, the Act has left unaddressed the means or standards
by which a court may determine whether a dispute is arbitrable or
whether an agreement to arbitrate exists at all. These questions are
vital simply because under an arbitration agreement, a party cannot be
compelled to arbitrate if it did not agree to do so.
Determination of the parties' intent is not problematic when the
parties have narrowly limited the disputes they are willing to arbitrate
to one or only a few very specific items. However, it is more often the
case that parties cannot foretell what the future may bring and
therefore attempt to design a more general arbitration clause, capable
of covering foreseeable as well as unforeseeable events. Determining
intention therefore becomes a distinct and different exercise
125. Berslein V. Centaur Insurance Company, 644 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
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depending upon whetJier the parties have chosen an itemized, narrow
or broadly sculpted arbitration clause.
Disputes regarding reinsurance have often been resolved
through arbitration guided by arbitration clauses that normally provide
as follows:
Any unresolved difference opinion between
the Reinsurer and the Company with respect to the
interpretation of this certificate or the performance of the
obligations under this certificate shall be submitted to
arbitration. Each party shall select an arbitrator within one
month after written request for arbitration has been received
from the party requesting arbitration. These two arbitrators
shall select a third arbitrator within ten days after both have
been appointed. Should the arbitrators fail to agree on a third
arbitrator, each arbitrator shall select one name from a list
of three names submitted by the other arbitrator, and the third
arbitrator shall be selected by lot between the two names
chosen. The arbitrators shall be impartial and shall be present
or former officials of other property or casualty insurance or
reinsurance companies. The arbitrators shall adopt their own
rules and procedures, and shall render their decision with a
view to effecting the intent of this certificate. The decision of
the majority of arbitrators shall be final and binding on the
parties. The cost of arbitration, including the fees of the
arbitrator, shall be shared equally unless the arbitrators
decide otherwise.
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In addition, the arbitration clauses normally provide lor the
location of the arbitration, the method of selection of arbitrators, (he
law which will apply and the procedures to be used.'^*^ The popularity
of arbitration is not based on its speed or economy but upon the hope
of the parties to the contract that they can maintain a degree of
control over the intensity of the dispute and ^he methods used to
resolve it, which they perceive to be impossible in the lawyer-
dominated field of litigation. Consequently, arbitration is perhaps best
resorted to under four circumstances.
First, it is frequently employed in connection witli routine
business under which the parties expect to have disputes that will not
interfere with the business relationship between them. In those
circumstances, arbitration sometimes can be carried out in an
atmosphere of civility that does not destroy an ongoing business
relationship. Because of the nature of the relationship that already
exists, they are unlikely to need the more extensive discovery of
witnesses and documents that may be available in litigation. Perhaps
most important, success of either party in this type of relatively minor
dispute is not determinative of the survival of the loser. It is entirely
possible that arbitration will produce a bad result. However, if the
dispute is such that the parties can more easily afford error than
stalemate, arbitration is a very logical choice.
A second type of case that lends itself well to arbitration is a
dispute in which the decision-maker will need a generally
international viewpoint in order to fairly decide the merit of an
126. Donald W. Rees. And Carol E. Reese, Reinsurance: The Basic and Bad FaiUi
Considerations, 39 Fed'n Ins & Corp Coun Q. at 361
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argument. Parties who feel they have a cosmopjolitan relationship
requiring such an international view may also conclude that a neutral
forum, in which neither party has an undue advantage, is the fairest
sites for the resolution of any dispute.
A third type of situation that may benefit from a neutral territory
arbitration clause is one for which the choice of a particular system of
law is very important. It may be possible, by use of an arbitration
clause that directs that arbitration awards not be subject to appeal, to
avoid expensive interpretations of law that might frustrate the purpose
of the contract.
The availability of the New York Convention for enforcement of
awards is a final good reason to arbitrate. Even if one obtains
jurisdiction over a foreign party in a friendly forum, recognition and
enforcement of court judgements in other countries where the
opponent may have assets requires considerable ingenuity as well as
patience. There is no uniform or widely accepted mechanism for
enforcing judgments, and error is easy to commit. Among the
jurisdictions which have acceded to it, the New York Convention gives
arbitral awards much enhanced authority and enforceability.
Collection may be greatly facilitated by the flexibility to pursue a
defendant wherever he may have assets.' 27
In the recent climate of insurance insolvencies, one particular
issue that has received judicial attention is whether a liquidator is
bound by the insolvent company's agreement to arbitrate. Liquidators
127. John Milligan-Wbyte and Mary Cannon Veed, Bermudian. English And American
Reinsurance Arbitralion Law And Practice And AlLemaLive Dispute Resolution
Methods. 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal at 148-149
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typically shun arbitration and prefer to resolve reinsurance disputes in
the state liquidation court. '^s
In Matter of Knickerbocker Agency v. Holz, the New York Court
of Appeals concluded that a liquidator was not compelled to arbitrate,
because the liquidation order vested exclusive jurisdiction over all
claims involving the insolvent company in the New York State
Supreme Court. The parties demanding arbitration were New York
State residents, and the insolvent company was organized under the
laws of the State of New York. Thus, it appears that Knickerbocker
did not concern a transaction falling under the Federal Arbitration Act.
In Bernstein v. Centaur Insurance Company, '^9 the court relied
upon existing authority. Hamilton Life Ins. Co. N.Y. v. Republic National
Life, to enforce an arbitration agreement against a liquidator. '^o The
Hamilton Life court compelled arbitration in a reinsurance dispute
where the reinsurer opposed arbitration on the ground that
application of the Federal Arbitration Act was precluded by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The court held that the Federal Arbitration
Act did not "invalidate, impair or supercede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating insurance." Rather the Federal
Arbitration Act regulated a method of handling disputes generally.'^'
The plaintiff was under the supervision of the New York State
Insurance Department.
In Bernstein, the reinsurer moved under 9 U.S.C. 3 to stay an
action initially commenced in federal district court by two ceding
128. Matter of knickerbocker Agency v. Holz, 4 N.Y. 2d 245 (1948)
129. 606 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
130. 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir 1969)
131. 408 F. 2d at 611; see 15 U.S.C. 1011 (1945)
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companies on several facultative reinsurance certificates, all of wliich
contained arbitration clauses. Both reinsureds were then placed into
liquidation and the respective New York and Vermont liquidators were
substituted as plaintiffs. The liquidators opposed the reinsurer's
motion on the ground that the McCarran-Ferguson Act precluded
federal interference with state insurance liquidation proceedings. The
federal district court rejected this contention and granted the stay
motion, adhering to the reasoning of Hamilton Life and also
distinguishing Knickerbocker on the ground that the insolvent
company and the liquidators were plaintiffs. '^^ Moreover, unlike
Knickerbocker, the reinsured was a non-resident. The court rejected
the notion that arbitration proceedings would interfere with state
liquidation proceedings, ^^a
The conflict between state liquidation proceedings and the
Federal Arbitration Act arose in a different procedural posture in
Universal Marine Insurance Company v. Beacon Insurance Company. '^-^
Following the court's order compelling arbitration at the request of
one defendant, Cherokee Insurance Company, was placed into
receivership pursuant to the Tennessee rehabilitation statute.
Cherokee then moved to stay the action and arbitration on the ground
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Uniform insurers Liquidation Act and
the doctrine of abstention mandated that the court abstain from the
exercise of jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act. The court
found that the claims under the Federal Arbitration Act were
132. 606 F. Supp. at 102-103
133. Id
134. No. ST-C-83-328. slip op.at4-7 (W.D.N. C. 1984)
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significant and the right to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act
was not likely to be given affect in state rehabilitation court.'"'''' The
court observed that the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act does not
require an exclusive state proceeding and there could be numerous
fragmented proceedings in various states, ^^e -p^g court therefore
ordered that the arbitrat'on should proceed and that the non-arbitral
claims should be tried in the federal court. The court noted that the
parties would be required to satisfy any judgment in the rehabilitation
proceedings.
Another New York federal district court, however, reverted to
the Knickerbocker analysis. In Washburn v. Corcoran, '^"^ which was an
action to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. 4, Judge Leval concluded
that enforcement of the Federal Arbitration Act against a liquidator
would interfere with state regulation of insurance in violation of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.'^^ The Washburn court reasoned that "as the
highest court of New York has ruled that arbitration is incompatible
with the commands of Article 74. it necessarily follows that
enforcement of a federal statute requiring would defeat this provision
of the state statute." ^^q Wasbbum appears to be the only decision
where a plaintiff moved to compel arbitration against a liquidator.
Interestingly, the plaintiff himself was a liquidator; Washburn involved
a dispute between the Illinois liquidator of Optimum Insurance
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 643 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
138. Id. at 556.
139. Id. at 557
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Company and the New York liquidator of its corporate parent, Ideal
Mutual Insurance Company.
The Washburn court seems to have ignored the fact that
Knickerbocker did not involve the Federal Arbitration Act, but rather a
dispute between New York residents falling under the New York
arbitration statute. Wasbbum makes no reference to Hamilton Life
which concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act did not impact upon
state regulation of insurance. It is submitted that the Bernstein court
reached the correct result. As the court in Universal Marine
recognized, arbitration of claims involving insolvent insurers or
reinsurers would not interfere with the operation of state statutory
liquidation procedures. An arbitration award cannot be immediately
executed upon and must be confirmed by a court having jurisdiction.
Absention might be proper if the award were brought to a
federal district court for confirmation. In the case of an award against
an insolvent company, the award would appropriately be presented to
the liquidation court for confirmation. At that time, the liquidation
court would be in a position to address any concerns under state
liquidation statutes.
In sum. the courts have devised solutions to conflicts between
arbitration and litigation, but their decisions are inconsistent. Except
for liquidation, the safest route to an efficient arbitration is to draft an
arbitration clause that anticipates potential disputes invohnng multiple
parties.
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B. Disadvantages In Reinsurance Arbitration
1. Multiple Parties and Multiple Clciims
Reinsurance controversies frequently involve multiple parties
and a sequence of separate transactions. There is a possibility in an
international controversy, not just that one's position might not be
sustained, but that he may suffer inconsistent determinations in
different jurisdictions. These inconsistencies can be avoided to the
degree one can arrange to have all of the parties to the controversy
brought into a single forum. United States procedural law. although it
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, generally provides fairly useful
and flexible mechanisms for consolidating separate litigations that
have a common factual nucleus, and coordinating the timing of
litigation so decisions can be made, if not in the same forum, at least
in logical order. ^^^^
In the reinsurance industry, arbitration clauses are the rule
rather than the exception, but it is not so common to find arbitration
agreements with a reinsurance intermediary or general agent, both of
whom may be appropriate and necessary parties to a reinsurance
dispute. If litigation is commenced to join non -arbitrating parties, the
parties to an arbitration agreement may choose to abandon arbitration
and litigate their disputes. However, if one of the parties insists on its
contractual right to arbitrate, litigation may be commenced by or
against the intermediary, general agent or another party involved in
the dispute. An arbitration clause may provide that an intermediary,
broker or agent, will consent to be joined in any arbitration between
140. See The United States Federal Court Manual For Complex LiUgalion
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the principals. Such a provision can be incoi"porated into llic slandajxl
"intermediary clause." However, the rule of the intermediary in tlic
selection of arbitrators will present a problem. An intermediary or
agent is unlikely to look favorably upon arbitration when it is without a
voice on the arbitration panel.
When faced with multiparty disputes where not all the
participants can be compelled to arbitrate, courts have stayed
litigation and allowed arbitration to proceed where the issues are
similar and the arbitration is likely to determine the issues in the
litigation. Federal courts in the Second Circuit have developed the
following criteria required for a determination that a stay should be
granted:
1. the moving party has not and will not impede the progress of
the arbitration proceeding;
2. the arbitration can be expected to conclude within a
reasonable time; and
3. such delay as may occur will not work undue hardship, the
courts will generally limit the length of the stay or otherwise impose
conditions on granting the relief. ^'^^
The same practical effect can sometimes be achieved in the
discretion of the trial court by the granting of a stay of litigation
pending the outcome of the arbitration. This is supported by the
court's inherent power to control its docket to prevent the
expenditure of effort on duplicative proceedings. Arbitration
proceedings cannot usually be stayed pending litigation, but there is
141. John M. Nonna and Jonathan E. SLrassberg, reinsurance Arbilralion: Boon or
Bust? 22 Tort & Insurance Journal 198 at 597
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no such restriction on stays of litigation. The non-contracting parties
may have a strong incentive to join the arbitration if they are invited.
and to include in it issues which might otherwise be litigated, so as to
avoid any prejudice arising from an arbitral decision taken in their
absence.
2. Consolidation
Another problem in which arbitration may result in dispute
resolution occurs where the disputants are parties to arbitration
clauses in separate reinsurance agreements, for example, disputes
between a reinsured and several of its reinsurers or even disputes
between parties with several agreements between them. In Universal
Marine Insurance Company Ltd. v. Beacon Insurance Company. '''2 ^j-jg
court attempted to encourage resolution of the dilemma created by
five separate arbitration agreements involving three parties, by staying
its order compelling arbitration to allow the parties"to reform the five
separate arbitration clauses in order to develop a unified arbitrable
process." 1'*^
Consolidation does not resolve the problem of arbitrator
selection under the typical methods provided in reinsurance
agreements. If each arbitration clause confers a right on each
reinsurer to select an arbitrator, then consolidation in a dispute
involving numerous reinsurers could result in as many arbitrators as
lawyers, most of whom would be appointed by reinsurers. Reinsurance
agreements have provided that all reinsurers shall be treated as one
142. 588 F. Supp. 735 (W.d.N.C. 1984)
143. 588 F. Supp. 739
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for the purpose of selection of arbitrators. Another alternative is
available in institutional arbitration where an independent organization
such as the American Arbitration Association can be authorized to
choose the arbitrators from a qualified list of candidates.''*''
Courts have been inconsistent in granting consolidation, in the
absence of a specific agreement to consolidate. In Compagnia
Espanola de Petroleas, S.A.. v. Nereus Shipping. S-A.^''^ the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts have the inherent
power to consolidate arbitration of claims involving common questions
of law and fact. However, recently in Weyerbauser v. Western Seas
Shipping Co..^'*^ the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that two
arbitrations could not be consolidated in the absence of a written
agreement providing for consolidated arbitration.'**"^ In Ore &
Chemical Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil Inc.,'"'*^ the court maintained that
"when the parties themselves have not placed a provision for
consolidated arbitration in their arbitration agreement, 9 U.S.C. 4 does
not provide any authority for a court order compelling consolidated
arbitration. "1^9 i^ Sociedad Anonima de Navegacion Petrolea v. Cia de
Petroleas De Cblie S.A.,i5° the Supreme Court implicitly rejected
consolidation absent agreement. In light of the unsettled law in this
area, it is advisable that if the parties do wish to consolidate
144. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules of The
American Arbitration Association, 13 .
145. 527 F. 2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975)
146. 743 F. 2d 635 (9th Cir. 1984)
147. 743F.2dat637
148. 606 F. Supp. 1510 (S. D. N.Y. 1985)
149. 606F. Supp. at 1510
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arbitrations among various reinsurers, or arbitrations with a reinsurer
and an intermediary or agent, a specific provision for consolidation be
inserted in the arbitration clause.
3. Discovery
It is sometimes argued that the limited degree of "discovery"
available in an arbitration proceeding is one of its chief virtues, since it
permits much less expensive proceedings. It is true to say that one of
the chief virtues of arbitration is the ability of the arbitral panel in ail
jurisdictions to control the collection of evidence for use at the
arbitral hearing in a manner that respects the balance between cost
and effectiveness.
In the first instance, most of the evidence relevant to a
proceeding will often be in the hands, or at least within the reach, of
only one of the parties. Under American Law, the arbitrators, upon
request and within their discretion, may order the production of
documents or persons within the reach of a party, and may enforce
their order by the indirect, but by no means ineffective mechanism of
drawing negative inferences from the failure of any party to produce
records or witnesses as ordered.
Accessibility of non-party witnesses is a more difficult problem.
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a panel of arbitrators may
take advantage of the subpoena power of the federal court in the
jurisdiction in which it is sitting, and on petition to the federal court,
have any contempt for such subpoenas punished. '5' It is cleaj-.
151. 9U.S.C. 7
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however, in American law, that automatic recourse to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure discovery mechanisms is not available in an arbitration
simply at the behest of the parties. The entire scope of discovery is
subject to the control of the arbitrators and vests only secondarily in
the courts. On the other hand, American courts will not automatically
accede to the arbitrators' recuest for assistance, and may demand a
showing of necessity or special circumstance. ^^2
C. Alternate Methods of Dispute Resolution
1. Settlement
Any dispute can be settled, at any time. A settlement can occur
within minutes of the development of a controversy or at its bitter
end. In a complex matter, the parties will struggle to develop a clear
understanding of exactly what their agreement entails and what
contractual and tort liability exists.
A commutation is a specialized form of settlement of an
insurance or reinsurance contract. A commutation provides for
estimation, payment and complete discharge of all or particular
obligations between the parties for reinsurance losses. '^^ From the
perspective of an assuming company, the advantages of a commutation
may include:
a. removing the future uncertainty regarding the ultimate losses
under the treaty,
b. eliminating future administration costs.
152. Oceanic Transport corp. of Monoria et aJ. v. Akoa Steamship Co, , 129 F. Supp. 160
(S.D.N.Y. 1954)
153. E. Wollen & F. Pomeranty, Commutation of Losses in Reinsurance, Law& Prac. Inf
Reinsur. Collections & Insolvency 143 (D. Spector & J. Milligan-WTiyle. eds.. 1988)
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c. utilizing available tax credits.
d. using tJie surplus/earnings relief obtained by commuting at
the discounted value.
e. providing additional capacity to write new business, and
f. recognizing reserve problems at minimum capital cost.
From the perspective of a cedant, the advantages of a
commutation may include:
a. obtaining immediate payment of long term obligations,
b. avoiding future oversight of an embarrassing book of business
or escaping a potential dispute,
c. eliminating costs associated with reporting to numerous small
reinsurers, and
d. solving collection problems.
The preparation for commutation involves consideration of:
a. the ultimate amount of premiums and losses under the treaty,
b. the cash flow underlying the ultimate losses and ultimate
premiums,
c. the present! i.e., discounted) value of the loss cash flow net of
future premiums, and
d. the uncertainty involved in the estimates provided.
A valid commutation can be a very useful and relatively
inexpensive way to quantify and minimize loss exposures or obtain a
refund of cash and a release from a reinsurance contract. A
commutation also can rapidly and cleanly settle a bad relationship
before it gets worse, as well as extricate an entity from a commitment
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which has proven unsatisfactory without unnecessary damage to the
business relationship with the other party.
Drafting a commutation agreement requires close collaboration
between management and counsel. Companies commuting
reinsurance agreements should be extremely careful to obtain expert
legal advice in all relevant jurisdictions before consummating the
commutation particularly with companies in strained circumstances."^"
2. Conciliation
Both the American Arbitration Association and the International
Chamber of Commerce maintain conciliation procedures, which may
be elected by the parties either in their contract or after a dispute has
arisen. However, the conciliator is commonly disqualified from acting
as an arbitrator in a later arbitration.
3. Arbitration or Litigation?
It is impossible to categorically recommend litigation or
arbitration as the best procedure for effectively resolving reinsurance
disputes. Arbitration has sometimes been perceived as the solution to
every inconvenience attendant to the judicial system. Because one has
to pay for the services of arbitrators and the space in which to conduct
the hearing, arbitration is not necessarily cheaper than comparable
litigation. Nor is it always quicker. In general, the delays attendant on
both litigation and arbitration arise primarily from the needs of the
154. John Milligan-Whyte and Mary Cannon Veed, Bem-iudian. English And American
Reinsurance Arbitration Law And Practice and aJtemative Dispute Resolution
Methods. 25 Tort & Ins Law Journal.
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parties and tJieir lawyers, rather than the inertia inherent in the court
or arbitral systems.
Litigation has the advantages of being determined by judges who
are usually familiar with basic principles of law, at least within the
jurisdiction where a judgment is rendered. However, this is not as
great an advantage in the international context as it is in the domestic
one. due to the hazards of foreign enforcement of judgements.
However, the choice between arbitration or litigation depends on the
nature of the dispute, its degree of complexity and the prospects of
enforcement of an arbitration award or judgment in other
jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
Reinsuranne agreements are made for the mutual benefit of the
two companies and are considered contracts of utmost good faith.
Utmost good faith is vital in any reinsurance relationship. The
reinsurance contract notwithstanding, the relationship is an exercise
of fiduciary responsibility to each other. An individual policyholder has
no direct contractual interest in the relationship. There is no privity
of contract between the insured and the reinsurer, and thus a
policyholder has no right to enforce the contract or collect directly
from the reinsurer. However, under special circumstances a reinsurer
may provide a cut-through endorsement for first-party insurance
wherein the original policy is amended in such a fashion that the
insured has the added protection of having the reinsurer pay a loss
directly in the event the insurance company issuing the policy cannot
pay. The net effect of a cut-through endorsement is only to revise the
route of payment and there is no increased risk to the reinsurer. '^^
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that much of the
reinsurer's concern focuses on extra-contractual damages. There are
two bases upon which a ceding insurer might ask its reinsurer to
assist it with punitive damages. One is when the damages are assessed
against the insured and the insurer is held liable because of its
154. Thompson, Critical Issues of the Eighties: How Trends in Reinsurance Will AlTect
Legal, LegislaUve. and Regulatory Actions, 16 Forum 1038 (1981) at 1043
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contractual relationship with tlie insured. In this case, usuiilly
referred to as an "excess policy limits judgment" the reinsurer shares
the cost because the obligation arises from the contractual obligation
of the insurer, a share of which has been ceded to the reinsurer. The
other basis for liability is the independent tort of the insurer
committed against its own insured. This typically arises in the
handling of claims. Reinsurers generally take the position that since
they do not control the claim-handling process of the insurer, they
should not be liable for a tortious act committed by persons over
whom they have no control or supervision. The insurer may argue that
the reinsurer should share in payment of extra -contractual damages
because this is an exposure which is a fact of life in the marketplace
today. They believe they should not be left to pay the costs which arise
from activities which are intended to be for the joint benefit of the
insurer and reinsurer, costs which may arise from practices which are
normal and usual in the insurance industry today. On the other hand,
the reinsurer believes, on the basis of its contract, that it is entitled to
expect that the insurer will fulfill in good faith its obligation to
conduct its business in ways which are beneficial to both parties to the
reinsurance contract. The reinsurer may also believe that there is a
legal impediment to its contribution to payment of extra-contractual
damages. Such payment would be in the nature of errors and
omissions coverage, provided without a filed contract, approved rates
or payment of premium taxes. '^^
155. Id. at 1051
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ExtracontractuaJ damages are in the nature of a peak
exposure, '^*3 if reinsurers are to pay them, certainly they should
receive some consideration from ceding companies. If reinsurers are
not compensated for their largess, then it is understandable that they
are now shying away from many types of coverage.
Of course, much of the difficulty in this area can be attributed to
reinsurance contract draftsmanship. Reinsurance contracts are
generally construed as covering contractual obligations only, if the
primary insurance contract does not cover punitive damages, then a
reinsurer will not be liable to a reinsured who pays punitive damages
on behalf of its insured. Thus, it is critically important that reinsurers
draft agreements with the utmost care, so as to preclude reinsurer
liability for damages they might ordinarily and reasonably regard as
"extra-contractual."^^^ A reinsurer may also be able to avoid
contributing to punitive damage awards imposed upon tlie reinsured
by asserting the existence of public policy which prohibits the
insurability of punitive damages.
Reinsurance is a highly international business. There is not
enough capital or capacity in any one country to let the theory of the
law of large numbers operate effectively without utilizing the world
reinsurance markets. Reinsurers traditionally think in terms of
balancing the exposures of one society against the perils present in
another. When one deals with immense exposures, one must use the
156. Id.
157. Bart c. Sullivan, Reinsurance in the Age of Crisis. 38 Fed'n Ins & Corp C.Q. (1987)
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entire world landscape. '^^ Therefore, the reinsurance business is
subject to economic and political disruption. Moreover, inflation may
have an effect far larger than people think and may well be attended by
other manifestations of economic crisis, such as sharp declines in the
securities market.
The effects of inflation are fa^ more serious for reinsurers than
for insurers. For example, assume that reinsurers hold every dollar of
reserves in casualty lines for an average of five years. Primary insurers
hold reserves about half as long. This is to be expected as reinsurers
handle the peak exposures and big cases take longer to settle than
small ones. Therefore, inflation has twice as long to operate against a
reinsurer's loss as it does against those of a ceding company. ''^'^
Many of these economic perils indirectly cause even more
problems when they accelerate insurer insolvency and cause insurer
assets to be liquidated in accordance with state statutes. If the court
orders liquidation, it will have exclusive jurisdiction of any claims
made against the insolvent insurer. Then the state administrator
liquidates the insurer for the benefit of all its creditors, including its
reinsurers. Therefore, it behooves reinsurers to closely monitor
ceding companies in regard to solvency. The reasons are numerous
and interrelated. In a general sense, insurer insolvency will concern
reinsurers in times of severe or unusual market pressures, and during
extended negative underwriting cycles. '6°
158. Thompson, Critical Issues of the Eighties: How Trends in Reinsurance Will Affect
Ivegal, Legislative, and Regulatory actions, 16 Forum 1038 (1981) at 1045
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The best protection for reinsurers from the dangers ol insurer
insolvency has come through governmental regulation. The role of the
federal government in insurance has grown gradually since the 1930s.
The 1980s may see the entry of the federal government into
reinsurance as well. In the past, the federal government stepped in to
provide insurance for risks generally viewed as uninsurable. One
method for doing this was to create federally chartered corporate
entities, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Securities Investors Protection Corporation. Still another approach is
represented by the federal riot reinsurance program. Urban Property
Protection and Riot Reinsurance Act of 1968, in which the
government serves as a reinsurer but significant portions of the risk
are retained by private insurers. '^^
Another federal development, coming from a different direction.
is the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The purpose of the McCarran-
Fetrguson Act was to exempt state insurance regulation from the
federal antitrust laws- the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts. The McCarran-Ferguson Act generally provides that
federal acts would not supersede state insurance regulation unless
specifically provided, but that the antitrust laws would "be applicable
to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law. i*^^ However, this special relationship has been
recently challenged by the Metzenbaum bill. This bill purports to
leave the regulation of insurance in the hands of the state regulatory
161. Thompson, Critical Issues of the Eighties: How Trends in Reinsurance Will .'MTect
Legal, Legislative, and Regulatory Actions, 16 Forum 1038 (1981) at 1045
162. Id. at 1055
79
authorities, but makes their regulation subject to minimum federal
standards. It also makes the federal antitrust laws applicable to
insurance. '^3
163. Id.
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